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A fair gambling is hard to be made between two spatially separated parties without introducing a
trusted third party. Here we propose a novel gambling protocol, which enables fair gambling between
two distant parties without the help of a third party. By incorporating the key concepts and methods
of game theory, our protocol will force the two parties to move their strategies to a Nash-equilibrium
point which guarantees the fairness through the physical laws of quantum mechanics. Furthermore,
we show that our protocol can be easily adapted to a biased version, which would find applications
in lottery, casino, etc. A proof-of-principle optical demonstration of this protocol is reported as well.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 42.50.Ex
Gambling—a game in which people wager money
or something valuable on an event with an uncertain
outcome—has a wide range of applications in every as-
pects of human society [1]. However, despite its long
history and wide spread usages, it has a long standing
problem yet to be resolved. Suppose a gambler (say Bob)
wants to gamble with the Casino (say Alice), how does
Bob know the gambling machine (GM) provided by Alice
is not biased towards Alice herself, especially in the case
of online gambling or lotteries?
The standard solution to this problem is to introduce a
trusted third party to provide an unbiased GM to make
sure the gambling is fair to both parties. However, in
some cases such third party which is trusted by both
parties does not exist. Surprisingly, by drawing from the
classical [2] and quantum game theory [3, 4], we have
found a protocol which enables two parties to create an
unbiased GM themselves to perform a fair gambling with-
out introducing any third party. The GM, which has two
independent parameters, is constructed by Alice and Bob
together who can change the values of the two parame-
ters respectively. Furthermore, the GM is elaborately
designed in a way that a Nash-equilibrium [2] exists—
each party has a strategy to choose his/her parameter
which can guarantee his/her gain is no less than a cer-
tain amount and neither of the two parties can benefit
from changing his/her own parameter unilaterally. In
this way, Alice and Bob are ‘forced’ to choose the Nash-
equilibrium in their own favor so that a stable GM can
be established.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we will de-
scribe the protocol in detail and explain how the Nash-
equilibrium can guarantee the GM to be unbiased to each
party. Then, we will show how to generalize this proto-
col to a full family of quantum gambling, including both
biased and unbiased, by introducing several parameters.
At last, we present a proof-of-principle optical experi-
ment to demonstrate the protocol.
The rules of the game and the strategies the players
should follow are explained below.
The rules of the game: Alice has two boxes, named A
and B, which are used to store a particle. The quantum
states of the particle stored in the two boxes are denoted
|a〉 and |b〉, respectively. Alice prepares the particle in a
state and then sends the box B to Bob. Bob wins in one
of the following cases: (1) Bob opens the box B and find
the particle. (2) Bob does not find the particle in box B
and asks Alice to send him the box A. Bob then detects
the state Alice prepared is different from the committed
state |ψc〉, where |ψc〉 = 13 |a〉 + 2
√
2
3 |b〉. In any other
cases, Alice wins.
Alice’s strategy: Alice prepares the particle in the fol-
lowing state:
|ψ〉 = √1− α|a〉 + √α|b〉, (1)
where α is a parameter controlled by Alice (0 6 α 6 1).
Bob’s strategy:
After receiving the box B, Bob splits the particle into
two parts. One part is still stored in box B and the
other part is stored in a new box B′. Specifically, Bob
performs the following operation: Bob splits the box into
two parts, B and B′:
|b〉 −→
√
1− β|b〉+
√
β|b′〉, (2)
where |b′〉 denotes the quantum state of the particle
stored in the box B′. The splitting ratio β is a parameter
controlled by Bob (0 6 β 6 1). After the splitting, Bob
opens the box B and measures the projection operator
on the state |b〉. If he finds the particle in the box B,
he wins. If he doesn’t, he asks Alice for the box A and
combines it with the box B′ to make a verification. If
the verification shows the initial state Alice prepared is
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2different from the committed state |ψc〉, Bob still wins;
otherwise, Alice wins.
This completes the definition of our protocol.
Let us briefly analyze the protocol and both players’
strategies. For Alice, she has a motivation to prepare a
state that the particle has a higher chance to stay in box
A (choosing a small α), so that Bob has a lower chance
to find the particle in box B. However, if α is too small,
the discrepancy between the prepared and the commit-
ted state would be too big which will result in a higher
chance for Alice to lose in the verification stage—there is
a tradeoff for Alice to choose her strategy (parameter α).
Similar analysis can apply to Bob’s strategy as well. Bob
can’t rely solely on the |b〉 projection stage (choosing a
small β) or the verification stage (choosing a big β). He
needs to consider both stages and choose an intermediate
β to maximize his chance to win. By now, the analysis
is just qualitative. Actually we have found that there
exists best strategies for both parties—the best strategy
for Alice (Bob) is to set α = 13 (β =
1
4 ). The average
gain of Alice (Bob) Ga (Gb) will never be negative once
she (he) chooses α (β) to be 13 (
1
4 ), where the equation
Ga + Gb = 0 holds as the gambling is a zero-sum game.
When both of them choose their best strategies, Ga and
Gb have to be zero and a fair gambling will be achieved.
To prove the above claims and features of the protocol,
let us write down the expression for Gb first [5],
Gb = P1 + P2 − (1− P1 − P2), (3)
where P1 and P2 denote the probability for Bob to find
the particle in box B and to find the initial state is dif-
ferent with committed state, respectively. When Bob
receives the box B and splits one part to the box B′, the
state becomes
|ψ0〉 =
√
1− α|a〉 +√α(
√
1− β|b〉+
√
β|b′〉). (4)
From Eq. 4, it is straightforward to calculate the proba-
bility (P1) of finding the particle in box B,
P1 = ‖〈 b|ψ0〉‖2 = α(1− β). (5)
The state of the particle will collapse to |ψ′0〉 if Bob fails
to detect the particle in box B, where
|ψ′0〉 =
√
1− α
1− α+ βα |a〉+
√
βα
1− α+ βα |b
′〉, (6)
If Alice did prepare the particle in the committed state
|ψc〉 initially, the state at this stage will be |ψ′c〉
|ψ′c〉 =
√
1
1 + 8β
|a〉+
√
8β
1 + 8β
|b′〉. (7)
Bob then makes a projection measurement on |ψ′c〉 for
the verification. If the outcome is negative, Bob knows
with certainty that state Alice prepared is different with
the committed state |ψc〉. The probability of detecting
such event is given by
P2 = (1− P1)(1− ‖〈ψ′c|ψ′o〉‖2)
=
β[8− 7α− 4√2α(1− α)]
1 + 8β
(8)
By substituting Eqs. (5) and (8) into Eq. (3), we can
get Gb as a function of α and β:
Gb(α, β) =
1
1 + 8β
{2α+ 8β − 1
−8[2β2α− β
√
2α(1− α)]}. (9)
As shown in Fig. 1a, the Gb function is saddle-shaped
and the saddle point is at α = 13 and β =
1
4 . Figures
1b and 1c are the projection of the Gb function to the
β − Gb plane and α − Ga plane, respectively. From
Fig. 1b (1c), it’s clear that, no matter what strategy
Alice (Bob) chooses, Bob’s (Alice’s) gain will always be
non-negative if he (she) sets his (her) parameter to be
1
4 (
1
3 ). Any party changes his/her strategy unilaterally
will only decrease his/her own gain. In this way, Nash-
equilibrium is achieved and both parties will stick their
strategy and thus a stable and fair game is achieved.
The above scheme effectively realizes a coin-tossing
protocol [6–13] where the one-shot gains for both par-
ties are balanced and the expectation value of the gains
for both parties are zero. However, in practice, there are
much more diverse gambling protocols, such as Roulette
or Lottery, where the one-shot gains are unbalanced and
the expectation value of the gains are non-zero. As only
the ratio of the one-shot gains matters, without loss of
generality, we fix Alice’s one-shot gain to be 1 and Bob’s
one-shot gain to be R. Now the task is to design a sta-
ble gambling protocol in which Bob’s one-shot gain is R
and the expectation value of Bob’s gain Gb to be δ. It
can be proved that our scheme can be easily extended to
realize such gambling protocol by just reappointing the
committed state to be
|ψc〉 =
√
1− γ|a〉 + √γ|b〉, (10)
where
γ =
4(1 + δ)(1 +R)
(2 + δ +R)2
. (11)
The Nash-equilibrium point for Alice’s and Bob’s strate-
gies would be α = 1−
√
1−γ
2 and β =
−1+γ+√1−γ
γ . Follow-
ing similar reasoning shown in last paragraph, setting α
and β to the above values are the best strategies for Al-
ice and Bob, as none of them can benefit from changing
their own strategy unilaterally. The earlier protocol can
be regarded as a special case where R = 1, δ = 0 and
γ = 8/9. The detailed calculation and proof can be found
in the Appendix.
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FIG. 1. Theoretical (surface) and experimental (circles) results of our protocol under R = 1 and γ = 8/9. (a) Bob’s average
gain in a three dimensional view. The Nash-equilibrium is the point of Gb = 0, β = 1/4 and α = 1/3. (b) Bob’s gain under his
parameter β. The best strategy is choosing β = 1/4. (c) Alice’s gain under her parameter α. Her best choice is α = 1/3.
Besides proposing the theory, we also implemented a
proof-of-principle experiment to demonstrate our gam-
bling protocols. As shown in Fig. 2, a He-Ne laser cen-
tred at 632.8 nm is attenuated to the level of ∼100 KHz
count rate to serve as single-photon source. The two po-
larization states |V 〉 and |H〉 are encoded as the two box
states |a〉 and |b〉, respectively. Thus the two parame-
ters α and β can be easily managed by half-wave-plates
(HWP). HWP1 is controlled by Alice to prepare the state
|ψ〉. Bob uses HWP2 and polarized beam splitter (PBS2)
to split the state |b〉 to |b〉 and |b′〉, and measures P1 at
the single-photon detector (D1). Then |b′〉 and |a〉 are
combined at PBS1 for verification.
A Sagnac interferometer (with interference visibility of
96%) is used in our setup to make sure the phase stability
is maintained throughout the whole experiment. HWP3
and PBS3 are used for the projective measurement, where
P2 and P3 can be measured from D2 and D3, respectively.
In our experiment, we simulated a fair coin-tossing
GM, where R and γ are set to be 1 and 8/9, respec-
tively. Both Alice and Bob chose a series of strategies
and the final gains for both parties are measured and
recorded. The results are shown in Fig. 1. All the data
are well agreed with the theoretical predictions. From
the results, we can clearly see that the best gain Al-
ice (Bob) can get is when she (he) choose the strategy
α = 1/3 (β = 1/4). For their own good, Alice and Bob
would both choose their best strategies and thus a Nash-
equilibrium is formed and a fair gamble is achieved.
The errors of our experimental results mainly come
from the imperfection of components used in the setup.
In our protocol of GM, although R can be chosen freely,
we recommend to set a small value of R as the error of
the gain Gb is proportional to R (see Eq. (13) in the
Appendix).
Let us now consider the possible “cheating” strategies
FIG. 2. Experimental demonstration of quantum gambling.
ATT represents attenuator which deeply attenuates the laser
to the single photon level. P is a polarizer. PBS is the
acronym for polarized beam splitter which transmitting hor-
izontal polarized light and reflecting vertical polarized light.
HWP indicates the half-wave-plate. HWP1 is controlled by
Alice as the parameter α; HWP2 and PBS2 are inserted in
the counter-clockwise route (green line) which are controlled
by Bob as the parameter β; HWP3 is chosen for projective
measurement and acts as the parameter γ. We use three
single-photon detectors D1, D2, and D3 to get the three prob-
abilities P1, P2, and P3, respectively. The polarization-Sagnac
interferometer ensures a stable system to collect the data.
Alice and Bob might use in this protocol. For Alice, if
she prepares the particle not only in boxes A and B but
also in another box C, this will only increase the proba-
bility of Bob finding the state different from committed
state, which has no benefit to Alice herself. Introducing
ancillary particles does not help Alice either. So, for Al-
ice, there is no meaningful cheating strategy. However,
for Bob, he might try to cheat. He can claim he find the
initial state different with the committed state even if
4the verification result shows the opposite. Alice cannot
tell if Bob is lying or not when the initial state is not
the same as the committed state. To detect this cheat-
ing, Alice can occasionally prepare the particle in the
commited state. However, this detecting procedure will
decrease Alice’s average gain. To compensate this loss to
Alice, the Ga on the Nash-equilibrium point can be set
to a value slightly greater than zero. This can be easily
achieved by changing γ or R as shown in our protocol.
We note that there are several other quantum proto-
cols [14–17] designed for gambling without third party.
However, none of them can achieve a fair game between
the casino and the gamblers.
In summary, we have invented a protocol which can
promise an unbiased GM to each party by using quan-
tum gambling theory and Nash-equilibrium. Further-
more, the choice of parameter values is flexible, and we
have found the relationship between these adjustable pa-
rameters, which can be used to guide a feasible imple-
mentation of full family of quantum gambling, including
both biased and unbiased cases. Compare with related
protocols such as quantum coin flipping [6–13] and quan-
tum bit commitment [18–26], the key difference is that
quantum gambling makes the cheating as part of strat-
egy, and set flexible rewards to affect the choice of casino
and player. This proof-of-principle experiment therefore
provides solid support for the applicability and feasibility
of our scheme. In a world full of competitions and co-
operations, we believe our protocol of gambling machine
without a third party will provide direct applications in
the near future, and also shed light on developing new
quantum technologies.
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APPENDIX
The rules of the protocol can be modified to be general.
The rules of the game: Alice can store a quantum
particle in two boxes, A and B, and the state of the
particle is denoted by |a〉 and |b〉, respectively. However,
she only sends one box (suppose box B) to Bob, who will
open the box and check where the particle is. Alice and
Bob consent to use a superposition state of |a〉 and |b〉 as
the conventional state. We can define the conventional
state to be
|ψc〉 =
√
1− γ|a〉 + √γ|b〉, (12)
Bob wins R coins in one of two cases: finding the particle
in box B, or detecting that the state prepared by Alice
is different from the conventional state |ψc〉. Otherwise,
Otherwise, he loses 1 coin to Alice.
The strategies for them are same as we described in the
main text. So the whole game can be acted as this: Alice
and Bob choose a state as conventional state |ψc〉 before
start. Then Alice chooses a parameter α to prepare a
state of Eq. (2), and sends box B to Bob. In Bob’s side,
5he chooses a splitting parameter β and splits the box B
into boxes B and B′. If Bob gets the particle in B, he
wins R coins (after Alice check the box A); If B is empty,
he asks Alice to send him box A and combines it with
box B′ to make a verification, then he may win R coins
or lose 1 coin depending on the verification results show
|ψ〉 6= |ψc〉 or |ψ〉 = |ψc〉, respectively.
Following the rules and the strategies of the game, the
expectation value of Bob’s gain is
Gb = R(P1 + P2)− P3. (13)
The state before Bob makes a detection can be written
as
|ψ0〉 =
√
1− α|a〉 +√α(
√
1− β|b〉+
√
β|b′〉). (14)
P1 is the probability of finding particle in box B and it
in turn leads to
P1 = ‖〈 b|ψ0〉‖2 = α(1− β). (15)
The state for verification is
|ψ′0〉 =
√
1− α
1− α+ βα |a〉+
√
βα
1− α+ βα |b
′〉, (16)
while the expecting state to be checked should be
|ψ′c〉 =
√
1− γ
1− γ + βγ |a〉+
√
βγ
1− γ + βγ |b
′〉. (17)
If Bob does not find the particle in box B, he will project
|ψ′o〉 onto |ψ′c〉. Then we can get
P3 = (1− P1)‖〈ψ′c|ψ′o〉‖2
=
(
√
(1− α)(1− γ) + β√γα)2
1− γ + βγ , (18)
P2 = 1− P1 − P3
=
β[γ + α− 2γα− 2√γα(1− α)(1− γ)]
1− γ + βγ . (19)
Substituting Eqs. (6), (9) and (10) into Eq. (4), we can
get Gb is in the form of four parameters: α, β, γ and R:
Gb =
1
1− γ + βγ {R(α− γα+ βγ)− (1− α)(1− γ)
−(1 +R)[β2γα− 2β
√
γα(1− α)(1− γ)]}.(20)
To proof there is a Nash-equilibrium point in the
Eq. (20), we use the definition of Nash-equilibrium. In
order to find the best strategy for Bob, we should first
minimize Gb for α and then maximize the result for β.
This means that no matter what strategy Alice chooses,
Bob can make sure his gain is no less than a value δ.
To find the best strategy for Alice, we should first max-
imize Gb for β and then minimize the result for α. The
calculation yields that the Nash-equibrilium is at
δ =
2 + 2R− γ(2 +R)− 2(1 +R)√(1− γ)
γ
; (21)
α =
1−√1− γ
2
; (22)
β =
−1 + γ +√1− γ
γ
. (23)
From Eq. (21), we can know how to choose the param-
eter of conventional state:
γ =
4(1 + δ)(1 +R)
(2 + δ +R)2
. (24)
Equations (21), (22), (23), and (24) are the results for
general quantum gambling.
